Pretending that we could pull that off would require us to act as legislators, not judges, and would result in nothing other than an “unanalyzed exercise of judicial will” in the guise of a “neutral utilitarian calculus.” New Jersey v. T. L. O., ); post, at 11–13 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.). Ante, at 30, 37. The appeals court allowed that the Baton Rouge clinic where Doe 5 had not obtained privileges would close. I, §4407(A)(3) (2003), 29 La. The doctrine also brings pragmatic benefits. See Moore v. Texas, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (Roberts, C. J., concurring) (slip op., at 1). 552 U.S. 442, 451 (2008). This brief historical review demonstrates that third-party standing is inconsistent with the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. The opinion concluded that “given the statute’s definition of medical emergency,” the waiting period did not “impose[ ] a real health risk.” Ibid. June Medical Services LLC v. In 2014, the Louisiana Legislature passed the Unsafe Abortion Protection Act (“Louisiana Act”), which required abortion providers who perform abortions at local clinics to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the clinic. The finding was based on a fundamentally flawed test. [3] In that case, a fractured Court concluded that two abortionists had standing to challenge a State’s refusal to provide Medicaid reimbursements for abortions. Thus, in class-action suits, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) demands that the named plaintiff possess “the same interest and suffer the same injury” as class members. There are hundreds of OB/GYNs with active admitting privileges in Louisiana who could lawfully perform abortions tomorrow. [7] Two of the doctors—Does 1 and 2—are petitioners and cross-respondents in this Court. The Fifth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the District Court’s interpretation of the standards that apply to abortion regulations, but disagreeing with nearly every one of the District Court’s factual findings. Ryan, Negligent Credentialing: A Cause of Action for Hospital Peer Review Decisions, 59 How. Diamond v. Charles, But when a State enacts a law “to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion,” the Casey plurality added a key qualification: Only “[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.” Ibid. La. For example, Doe 2 testified that he was told not to bother asking for admitting privileges at University Health in Shreveport because of his abortion work. J.). rather than a “tryout on the road.” ’ ” Anderson, 470 U. S., at 575. Although the State challenged the District Court’s findings only with respect to Does 2 and 3, the Court of Appeals went further. The plaintiffs then asked this Court to stay the Fifth Circuit’s judgment. In this context, courts applying a balancing test would be asked in essence to weigh the State’s interests in “protecting the potentiality of human life” and the health of the woman, on the one hand, against the woman’s liberty interest in defining her “own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life” on the other. But the Court of Appeals did not dispute, and the record supports, the District Court’s additional finding that, for “the same reasons that Does 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 have had difficulties getting active admitting privileges, reasons unrelated to their competence . Nor does the need for clear rules dissipate as the stakes grow. 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, App. When it comes to the factual record, litigants normally start the case on a clean slate. And, as in Whole Woman’s Health, the State introduced no evidence “showing that patients have better outcomes when their physicians have admitting privileges” or “of any instance in which an admitting privileges requirement would have helped even one woman obtain better treatment,” 250 F. Supp. Seeking to set all these difficulties aside, today’s decision contends that Louisiana has waived its prudential standing arguments. 576 U.S. 591, 623 (2015) (opinion concurring in judgment) (quoting D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years 1789–1888, p. 272 (1985)). But plaintiffs do not claim any right to provide abortions, nor do they contest that the State has authority to regulate such procedures. Minden subjects all new appointees to “not less than” six months of “focused professional practice evaluation.” Record 9281; see also id., at 9252. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 899 (joint opinion). Id., at 508–510. This case features a blatant conflict of interest between an abortion provider and its patients. post, at 20–21 (opinion of Alito, J. In these special cases, the logic goes, the plaintiff ’s interests are so aligned with those of a particular right-holder that the litigation will proceed in much the same way as if the right-holder herself were present. Hospitals look beyond the mere possession of a license, and they do that for very obvious reasons. First, what the plurality characterizes as a waiver arises from the State’s admission that applicable circuit law allowed the plaintiffs standing. ); ante, at 15–16 (opinion of Roberts, C. When a private plaintiff seeks to vindicate someone else’s legal injury, he has no private right of his own genuinely at stake in the litigation. Following a six-day bench trial, the District Court found that Louisiana’s law would “result in a drastic reduction in the number and geographic distribution of abortion providers.” June Medical Services LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. A finding based on an erroneous legal test is invalid; it cannot be sustained under the “clearly erroneous” rule. Women wishing to obtain abortions have not taken any action in reliance on the ability of abortion providers to sue on their behalf, and eliminating third-party standing for providers would not interfere with the ability of women to sue. Doe 2 testified at trial that he understood this to mean that he would have to submit records of hospital admissions, even though he had not “done any in-hospital work in ten years.” Id., at 387; see id., at 437 (“I’ve explained that that information doesn’t exist”). E-mails in the record reveal that Doe 2 only half-heartedly applied for privileges, did so on the advice of counsel, and calculated that an outright denial would be best for his legal challenge. 18–1460, p. i, a majority of the Court all but ignores the question. It wants to rely on the rights of third parties whose interests conflict with its own. Having rejected the District Court’s findings with respect to all but one of the physicians, the Court of Appeals concluded that “there is no evidence that Louisiana facilities will close from Act 620.” Id., at 810. The Court of Appeals did not question Doe 6’s decision not to apply to Tulane Hospital. These doctors had an incentive to do the bare minimum that they thought the judge would demand—and as it turned out, the judge did not demand much, not even an appearance in his courtroom. Yet Doe 5 testified that even this doctor was “too afraid to be my covering physician at the hospital” because, while the transfer agreement could apparently be “kept confidential,” he feared that an agreement to serve as a covering physician would not remain a secret. The following timeline details key events in this case: 1. The plurality notes that Doe 6’s medication abortion patients have never been admitted to a hospital, but the plurality also argues that very few surgical abortion patients are admitted. But even in Here the plurality expressly acknowledges that we are not considering how to analyze an abortion regulation that does not present a substantial obstacle. This, we said, showed that the law served no “relevant credentialing function,” but prevented qualified providers from serving women who seek an abortion. App. a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law’ ” (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., Nor is this possibility farfetched. And the purported substantive due process right to abort an unborn child is no exception—it is an individual right that is inherently personal. 542 U.S. 1, 15, 17–18 (2004). As we have said, the court found that the Act would prevent Does 1, 2, and 6 from providing abortions. “[N]otwithstanding the good faith efforts of Does 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 to comply with the Act by getting active admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where they perform abortions, they have had very limited success for reasons related to Act 620 and not related to their competence.” Id., at 78. 3d, at 76; see App. The review conducted by hospitals goes beyond that of the Board in another way: it is continuous. Perhaps the plurality sees that answer as obvious, given its apparent conclusion that the Act would offer the public no benefits of any kind. The court should have asked whether the doctors’ efforts to acquire privileges were equal to the efforts they would have made if they knew that their ability to continue to perform abortions was at stake. Today’s decision doesn’t just overlook one of these rules. 1987). The question today however is not whether Whole Woman’s Health was right or wrong, but whether to adhere to it in deciding the present case. Casey repeats that “substantial obstacle” standard nearly verbatim no less than 15 times. And “[w]hen the record is examined in light of the appropriately deferential standard, it is apparent that it contains nothing that mandates a finding that the District Court’s conclusion was clearly erroneous.” Anderson, 470 U. S., at 577. The District Court here, like the trial court in Whole Woman’s Health, faithfully applied these standards. See Carlson v. Green, The sole authority Barrows cites in support of the rule’s “prudential” label is a single-Justice concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., Casey relied on precedent establishing that judicial bypass procedures “prevent another person from having an absolute veto power over a minor’s decision to have an abortion.” Akron, 497 U. S., at 510. 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, The court found that Louisiana women already “have difficulty affording or arranging for transportation and childcare on the days of their clinic visits” and that “[i]ncreased travel distance” would exacerbate this difficulty. And no one suggests this suit differs from those cases in any meaningful way. Whether this type of privileges satisfies the statute is yet unknown—so, again assuming the worst, today’s decision simply ignores the possibility. J. . as Amici Curiae 12. In the context of laws implicating only the State’s interest in fetal life previability, the Casey plurality did describe its “undue burden” test as asking whether the law in question poses a substantial obstacle to abortion access. These include its determination that Louisiana’s law poses a “substantial obstacle” to women seeking an abortion; its determination that the law offers no significant health-related benefits; and its determination that the law consequently imposes an “undue burden” on a woman’s constitutional right to choose to have an abortion. Justice Alito imagines a number of ways that Christus may have become aware of Doe 2 or Doe 3’s abortion practice. Here's what's at stake. The panel majority concluded that Act 620’s impact was “dramatically less” than that of the Texas law invalidated in Whole Woman’s Health. 414 U.S. 488, 501–502 (1974); Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., But they continued to require legal injury, adhering to the “obvious” and “ancient maxim” that one’s real-world damages alone cannot “lay the foundation of an action.” Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288, 302–303 (1846). It only obliquely refers to the concept by invoking the broader requirement that a plaintiff must “show that he is injured by [the law’s] operation.” Id., at 347. 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). Even in the best case, “the demand for services would vastly exceed the supply.” Ibid. Second, the State says that the record does not show that Act 620 will burden every woman in Louisiana who seeks an abortion. Triplett is inapposite here for at least two reasons. 239 U.S. 33, 38–39 (1915); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Justice Breyer announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join. Likewise, this Court has held that a pediatrician lacks standing to defend a State’s abortion laws on the theory that fetuses are his future potential patients. This rule ensures that the judiciary stays focused on the “factual situation before it,” New York v. Ferber, In Louisiana, a woman may make her first visit to an abortion clinic the day before the procedure, and if she goes to June Medical, she is likely to have a short meeting with a counselor, not the doctor who will actually perform the procedure. Record 9640; see App. The History of June Medical Services v. Russo: Admitting Privileges and Abortion Clinics. But the factors the hospital considers for both tiers of privileges are facially identical. Nor is that the end of the plaintiffs’ standing problems. Requiring hospital admitting privileges, witnesses testified, would help ensure that clinics hire competent professionals and provide a mechanism for ongoing peer review of physician proficiency. It conceded that Doe 1 would not be able to obtain admitting privileges in spite of his good-faith attempts. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 24). 543 U.S. 125, 129–130 (2004); see also Powers v. Ohio, . Louisiana adopted Act 620 in the aftermath of the Kermit Gosnell grand jury report, which expounded on the failures of regulatory oversight that allowed Gosnell’s practices to continue for an extended period. Note: On February 6, 2020, June Medical Services v. Gee changed to June Medical Services v. Russo due to a staffing change at the Louisiana Department of Health. Ante, at 19–35. Id., at 884 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Loss of admitting privileges, as well, might signal a problem meriting further investigation by state officials. It is the “means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.” Vasquez v. Hillery, The Court nevertheless concluded that it need not bother with our founding document’s text, because the Court’s prior decisions—chief among them Griswold—had already divined such a right from constitutional penumbras. It is true that Louisiana did not affirmatively make the third-party standing argument until it filed its cross- petition for certiorari, but “[w]e may make exceptions to our general approach to claims not raised below.” Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, Code, tit. They misuse the doctrine of stare decisis and the standard of appellate review for findings of fact. In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. ___ (2016), the Court concluded that Texas’s admitting privileges requirement “places a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a previability abortion” and therefore violated the Due Process Clause of the Suppose that for a substantial number of women Louisiana’s law imposes no burden at all. The Court further explained that whether a plaintiff “alleges that [the defendant] violated his statutory rights ” rather than “the statutory rights of other people ” was a question of “particularization” for an Article III injury. 250 F. Supp. Admin. The evidence supporting those findings is stronger than in Whole Woman’s Health and showed that opposition to abortion played a role in some hospitals’ decisions to deny the plaintiff-physicians admitting privileges. He did little to pursue applications at two other hospitals because he was not optimistic about his chances and those hospitals required a certain amount of unpaid service to the poor. 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (similar). can show a significant change either in factual conditions or in law.” Agostini v. Felton, 462 U.S. 416, 452–466 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Doe 2. In truth, Roe v. Wade, But Doe 2 did not introduce evidence (or seek to elicit testimony from Dr. Groome) substantiating his account of this informal inquiry. To justify injunctive relief on that theory, however, it can’t be enough to show that the law would induce any particular doctor or clinic to stop providing abortions. The test that petitioners advocate would give abortion providers an unjustifiable advantage over all other regulated parties, and for that reason, it was rejected in Casey. 14–cv–00525, Doc. See Response and Reply for Petitioners (No. The Texas statute at issue in Whole Woman’s Health required abortion providers to hold “ ‘active admitting privileges at a hospital’ ” within 30 miles of the place where they perform abortions. (internal quotation marks omitted). And it was well within the District Court’s discretion to credit that reading of the record. 52(a). Brief for Respondent 75. Spokeo, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted). Their sole claim before this Court is that Louisiana’s law violates the purported substantive due process right of a woman to abort her unborn child. Unless Casey is reexamined—and Louisiana has not asked us to do that—the test it adopted should remain the governing standard. And when we granted the State’s cross-petition, we took up this question and received briefing and argument on it. 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990) (Scalia, J., for the Court) (attorney raising rights of clients to challenge restrictions on fee arrangements); Craig, 429 U. S., at 192 (convenience store raising rights of young men to challenge sex-based restriction on beer sales); Doe, 410 U. S., at 188 (abortion provider raising the rights of pregnant women to access an abortion); Carey v. Population Services Int’l, Of privileges about which Doe 6, Doe 4 ’ s injunction to remain in effect similarly distant relationships their! Of foreshadowings down an abortion regulation ( 1996 ). 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